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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MANAISM
BY GEORGE P. CONGER
IN COMMON
with every branch of mquiry, the history of reHg-
ions has been subjected during recent years to notable attempts
at revision, and, as often the case in other inquiries, the larger con-
sequences of the revisions have not yet been fully considered. This
seems to me to be peculiarly the case in that revision of views which,
under the influence of Marett^ and Levy-Bruhl,- traces the roots
of religion not to animism but to manaism.
A generation ago the English anthropologists had apparently
succeeded m establishing the view that animism, in the sense of
belief in spiritual beings,^ marked the most rudimentary form of
religion. The notion that belief in personal spiritual beings could
have come originally from primitive men's experiences with shadows,
echoes, dreams, sleep, and death was not welcome to the conserva-
tives of that day; but after all, if religion was to be studied at all
in evolutionary perspectives, there were a good many points in com-
mon between animism and theism. The theist from his advanced
position and with his refined doctrines could look across the ages
at the primitive animist and regard him as a kindred spirit, a younger
brother groping for light. It was the presupposition of animism that
primitive mentality was essentially like our own.
I^Iore lecently other workers, relying upon numerous investiga-
tions of primitive peoples and upon a few systematic interpretations
1 R. R. Marett, The Threshold of Religion (1914); article, "Mana," in
Here, Vol. Ill (1916).
2 Levy-Bruhl, Lcs fonciicns mentales dans les societes infcrieurcs (1912) ;
Primitive Mentality, translated by L. A. Clare (1923).
3E. B. T\lor, Primitive Culture, 2 volumes (1913). Vol. I, p. 425.
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of them, have detected and developed another view, with the pre-
supposition that primitive mentality was different from ours. Accord-
ing to Levv-Rruhl this primitive mentality is predominantly a social
or group aliair rather th.an an individual affair ; it is pre-perceptual.
and characterized by an unbroken transition between what we have
subsequently learned to distinguish as subject and object ; it is a
matter of attitudes and actions rather than of elaborate explanations
;
and it has not yet brought into focus the sharp distinction which
generations of logicians have registered in the law of contradiction.
It is in a matrix such as this that primitive men develop the prac-
tices and loter the beliefs with reference to the mysterious power
referred to bv the term "mana" and cognate terms.
II
What is the possible significance of such manaism for presem-
day philosophy ? There are at least three points to be settled before
the question can be answered with any definiteness. In the first
place, there is the objection that the characteristics attributed by
Levy-Bruhl to primitive mentality are hard to make clear and diffi-
cult to accept ; but this very point, according to the sponsors of the
manaistic theories, only goes to show that primitive mentality is dif-
ferent from ours. The difficulty can be said to inhere in the very
nature of the argimient.
There is in the second place the fact that -the manaistic interpre-
tation of the data has not convinced some investigators and inter-
preters. If one finds, with Codrington,* that mana "essentially
belongs to personal beings to originate," or concludes, with Miss-
Campbell," that mana is essentially a personal power, one has. for
our present purposes, only called animism by another name. If
manaism has any peculiar significance for constructive thinking, one
must proceed according to the view of Marett. and say that in mana-
ism the conceptions of personal and non-personal powers are still
•• R. H. Codrington, 77i.- Mrhnu-.sninsStitdlrs i>j Their .4iitliropology and
Polk- Lore (1S91), p. 119n.
^ I. (). Cr;mpl>ell, "Manaism: A Study in the PsyclioloRv of Religion."'
Aiiicriciiii Journal of Psycliohniy. \'ol. 2''. p. 1 (1''1S). \alual)U' hihliograpliy
appended.
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in solution'^ and not yet precipitated ; that where manaism exhibits
animistic notions the latter are later accretions rather than primary
features ;^ and moreover that it is of no great concern for primitive
mentality ^f practices implying both personal and impersonal powers
are carried on in the same group or at the same level.*
The third difficulty is found in the method, more common a
few years ago than at present, which explains institutions and be-
liefs solely in terms of their origins. Any one who seeks to read
a philosophy of religion in manaism must bear in mind that manaism
at its best represents only an almost vanishingly primitive stage of
religion.
Ill
If these preliminary questions can be adjusted provisionally in
some such manner as I have indicated. I think the possible signifi-
cance of manaism can be summed up under four heads. The first
may be called methodological. A part of the value of manaism cer-
tainly lies in the facility it afifords for interpreting other data in the
history of religions, particularly that of magic and tabu. This point
has been covered by Marett^ and needs no further development.
Manaism has a second kind of significance which I would call
epistemological. In order for the point to be entertained, manaism
must perhaps be taken more seriously than it has sometimes been
taken; but if it is taken seriously, it offers a kind of prehistoric pro-
test against John Locke and his successors who have worked so hard
for mind's own sake to isolate mind from the world. Locke's as-
sumption that the mind does not know the world, but knows only
its sensations of the world, created a gap between mind and world
which the Kantians have ever since sought to capitalize, and which
the Hegelians and the realists in different ways have tried to close.
The history of modern philosophy until recently has been predomi-
nantly a series of debates about epistemology and its supposed con-
sequences. The debate is still going on. somewhat diminished in
intensity because the problems of the natural sciences and of industry
6 R. R. Marett, The Threshold of Religion, p. 119.
'' Same, article. "Mana," Here, Vol. Ill, p. 377.
8 Same, p. 378f.
9 Same, p 378 f.
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alike demand more direct action upon the environment. ^Nlanaism
indicates that for primitive men there was no great gulf between
mind and world ; the senses were, so to speak, transparent, an;*
action was overt. Manaism here, as elsewhere, aftords only the bar-
est of answers ; but at least it may serve to help pose the question
whether the reflective theories of knowledge are not over-reflective,
and whether they do not distort our situation rather than clarify it.
When one begins to discredit reflective theories because they are
reflective, one gravitates rather naturally towards intuitionism. The
kinship between Levy-Bruhl's pre-logical mentality and Bergson's
intuitionism is noticeable, particularly in the matter of the reconcili-
ation of contradictories.^" But if manaism points toward intuition-
ism at all, I think it should be made clear that it points toward im-
portant modifications in Bergson's doctrine. Bergson's intuitionism
is individualistic and non-practical ; manaism represents attitudes
toward the environment assumed by groups, and first for practical
rather than for theoretical or ideal interests.
' Perhans, in the third place, one may discern in manaism a hint
for dealing with present-day psychological problems. Everyone has
to reckon, in one way or another, with extreme behaviorism and
its reduction of mentality to physiology, and with the emergent the-
ory of mind and its derivation of mental functions from bodily proc-
esses. The hint which manaism aflfords here is hard to state in
words which will not be misleading ; perhaps it can be phrased thus
:
W'e are to find out about the world around us, not merely through
avenues of psychologj^ and epistemology (as ordinarily treated) but
also of physiology. Knowledge involves not merely mentality, but
also vitality, Irving King has called manaism a biological attitude ;"
and on the other hand, Patrick has called attention to the fact that
the old lines on which the mind-body problem was argued are being
obliterated by the newer investigations in physiology and psychol-
ogy.'- Manaism is of course rudimentary and hopelessly crude :
but at least it is the attitude of men who do not live by taking
thought alone. It is neither wholly practical nor wholly speculative :
this is perhaps the reason why it appeals to neither of two promi-
nent current and rather divisive philosophies. But, like an organ-
1" Sec ].. Levy-Briihl. Primitive McntaVity. pp. 60, 93. 443. Compare also
H. Rorgsoii. I»trod<ictinti lo Mctnffliysics, translated l)y T. E. Hulma (1912)
p. 39f.
'1 T. Kiii^'. '/•/;,• Prr.'lof'niriit of Krlinion (1910), p. 149.
'-Ci. T. W. Patrick. "Tlu- lunergont Tlieor)- of Mind," Journal of Philns-
ophy. Vol. 19, p. 706 (1922).
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ism which is neither animal nor plant, it still possesses a modicum
of vitality and exhibits an astonishing persistence.
Most important. I think, is the possible metaphysical bearing- of
manaism. Let us suppose, in accordance with views sketched abi:)ve,
that thinking, although it represents a high level of development, is
nevertheless a late development and on the whole is secondary and
derivative. Clear thinking develops in a matrix or a medium which
is not clear. I think that we may extend the principle, and say that
theism, with its thought-out doctrines of God although it represents
a high level of development, is secondary and derivative, and wJicn
it dez/elops, Icai'cs something of value behind. A great difficulty
with the historic doctrines of theism seems to be that they are too
finely-drawn. Like certain medieval paintings of men's souls, their
very clearness for us defeats their purpose. This was of course
the case with our oft-mentioned childhood ideas of God as "a Big
Man .up in the sky." but the difficulty nowadays is more ominous.
We are now facing the possibility that it may apply also to our elab-
orate and sophisticated doctrines of God as a Big j\Iind up in the
sky, or as a Cosmic or Super-Cosmic JMind. ]\Iost naturalists agree
with this statement, but without recognizing the fact to which mana-
ism bears witness—namely, that what is left behind as theism devel-
ops may be both vital and persistent.
If this is the suggestion of manaism. certainly it would give new
point to the familiar preachment that "religion is a life." It would
further, reinforce widespread current tendencies to regard tradi-
tional distinctions between matter and spirit as overdrawn. And
it would give a world-wide aboriginal basis for the view which, per-
haps after long eclipse, is beginning to loom up again with impos-
ing grandeur upon the horizons of religion—the view, namely, that
the true object of religion is the stupendous universe around us. The
suggestion of manaism might be that even though theism is second-
ary and derivative, atheism in any narrow sense is equally second-
ary and derivative ; both alike crystallize out from an original solu-
tion. Nor is the original solution properly describable as pantheism
:
to call it pantheism, or to call it anything else, is more like attempt-
ing to recover the original solution by placing one hard crystal be-
side the other and weighing the two together. Properly speaking,
religion should never be defined or described ; but only religious
men should attempt to define or describe other things.
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Finally, manaism, more than anything else since developed, re-
flects a certain paganism residual and latent in all the religions, a
paganism which theism by its very loftiness has overshadowed, or
else by its definiteness has relegated to the realm of esthetics. Mana-
ism does not attord a philosophy of religion, any more than a cry
affords a language or a horde a civilization. But it may serve to
set the problem of a philosophy of religion in more inclusive terms,
and to remind us of otice unbroken relations between religion, the
universe, and the life and mind of man.
